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Abstract
This working paper after quickly reviewing the different types of existing macro
models presents some basic tools that have proved useful for analysing monetary policy in
recent years.  Through the use of a simple quantitative forward-looking model of output,
inflation and interest rate determination, the paper tries to familiarise the reader with some
of the techniques used in research on optimal policy, including rational expectations
theory, timeconsistency analysis, the Lucas critique and computer simulation techniques.
The explanation proceeds gradually.  First, a single linear difference equation is used to
explain how solutions to models with forward-looking expectations can be obtained.  Then
it deals with methods used to solve more general models for optimal policies.  Finally, the
potential usefulness of these techniques is explained through a series of applications to
monetary policy.2 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 3
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this text is to present some basic tools that have proved useful for
analysing monetary policy in recent years.  Almost all the papers dealing with this topic
now start with the same simple quantitative model of output, inflation and interest rate
determination which is the economic setting for  researchers such as Woodford (1999) and
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).  It is one of a class of 'new synthesis' macroeconomic
models that have as key features: intertemporal optimisation, rational expectations,
imperfect competition and costly price adjustments.  Nominal price rigidities create a
channel through which monetary policy can affect output.  This is a very useful tool, and
recent research consists of variations around this model.  Research by both academics
and practitioners on optimal policies is now rapidly expanding; it necessitates an
understanding of quite sophisticated techniques, and this paper tries to familiarise the
reader with some of them.  The framework used here is based on modern macroeconomic
research including rational expectations theory, timeconsistency analysis, the Lucas
critique and computer simulation techniques.
The layout of the paper is as follows.  First, it presents a quick review of the
recent history of the different types of existing models.  Section two uses a very simplified
model (in fact, one equation) with some desirable features in terms of expectations to
explain how models with forward-looking expectations can be solved and what can be
expected of a sensitivity analysis.  Then section three presents the Lucas critique in that
context.  Afterwards, section four offers a general analysis and deals with techniques used
to solve models for optimal policies.  Finally, their potential usefulness is shown through a
series of applications to monetary policy.2 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
2.  HISTORY OF THE VARIOUS TYPES OF MODELS
During the 1960s and 1970s, the specification, estimation, use and evaluation of
large-scale econometric models for forecasting and policy analysis represented a major
research topic in macroeconomics.  An equation describing the behaviour of a policy
instrument was incorporated into these models, facilitating model simulations of alternative
policy rules.  These simulations provided an estimate of the impact on the economy's
dynamic behaviour of changes in the way policy was conducted.  For example, a policy
under which the interest rate was adjusted rapidly in response to inflation changes could
be contrasted with one in which the response was more gradual.
A key hypothesis was that specification of the policy rule did not cause variations
in the estimated parameters of the model.  If this were not the case, then we could no
longer treat the model's parameters as unchanged when altering the policy rule.  The
Lucas critique emphasised that the parameters of the model would shift when policy
changed.  The main reason underlying constant parameters was that expectations were
assumed to be adaptive or, in other words, backward-looking and therefore unresponsive
to those changes in policy that would be expected to alter expectations about future
events.  In other words, modelling expectations based on the past behaviour of variables
or making extensive use of the usual error correction models were common practice,  but
can provide misleading results when the model is used to simulate fiscal and monetary
policy rules.
While large scale econometric models continued to play an important role in
discussions of government stabilisation policies, they fell out of fashion among academic
economists as a result of the Lucas critique, the increasing emphasis on the role of
expectations in theoretical models, and dissatisfaction with the empirical treatment of
expectations in existing large-scale models.  Subsequently, a gap emerged between
applied macroeconomics as practised by academics and the macroeconomics contained
in large-scale models.  The academic literature showed a continued interest in small-scale
rational expectations models as well as the development of larger-scale models, all of
which incorporated rational expectations into some or all aspects of the model's
behavioural relationships.
There is a spectrum of modelling approaches which vary according to the degree
of theoretical structure as opposed to data-mining.NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 3
The Lucas critique implies a constructive w ay of improving on conventional
evaluation techniques by modelling economic phenomena in terms of structural
parameters.  By structural we simply mean invariant with respect to policy intervention.  It
is necessary to rely more heavily on economic theory here.  This favours use of Dynamic
General Equilibrium Models to analyse the effects of alternative feedback rules for
monetary policy, since these models stand up better to the Lucas critique.  These models
are derived entirely from optimising behaviour by economic agents and represent the
beginning of the spectrum.  Originally, in line with Kydland and Prescott (1982), dynamic
general equilibrium models were calibrated, while nowadays many of them are at least
partially estimated.  The basic idea of calibration is to choose parameter values on the
basis of microeconomic evidence, and then to compare the model's predictions concerning
the variances and covariances of various series with those in the data.  From Romer
(1996, p. 180): "Calibration has two potential advantages over estimating models
econometrically.  First, because parameter values are selected on the basis of
microeconomic evidence, a large body of information beyond that usually employed can be
brought to bear, and the models can therefore be held to a higher standard.  Second, the
economic importance of a statistical rejection, or lack of rejection, of a model is often hard
to interpret.  A model that fits the data well along every dimension except one which is
unimportant may be overwhelmingly rejected statistically.  Or a model may fail to be
rejected simply because the data are consistent with a wide range of possibilities".
However, not all the parameter values can be pinned down by microeconomic evidence.
Such a tool has also been built at the NBB these last few years, Dombrecht and Wouters
(2000).
At the other end of the spectrum, vector autoregression models (VARs) estimate
statistically the dynamic interactions between a set of variables without imposing strong
theoretical assumptions.  So VARs capture average past experience in a less restricted
way. However, since VARs are reduced form models they are especially vulnerable to
structural economic changes and to the Lucas critique.  Moreover, unrestricted VARs yield
no economic interpretation of average past experience.  Structural vector autoregressions
(SVARs) try to improve this situation by introducing "identifying" restrictions.  Actually, the
latter are of two kinds : either restrictions on the matrix that links the observable VAR
residuals to the underlying structural disturbances (e.g. monetary policy shock affects
output with a lag), or restrictions on the long-run effects of the disturbances on observed
variables (e.g. long-run neutrality of money implies that a monetary policy shock has no4 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
permanent effect on output).  These restrictions enable researchers to assign an economic
interpretation to each of the disturbances in the model.  The advantage of SVARs is that
they can be used to diagnose the sources of shocks that have affected links between
variables.  Observed patterns of past behaviour can be interpreted as system responses to
particular kinds of economic shocks.  The vast literature on VARs initiated by Sims (1980)
also provided a useful benchmark against which structural models could be gauged.  A
criticism of (S)VARs is that this approach misses important information available to policy
makers.  In particular, many of the VAR models used to assess monetary policy fail to
incorporate forward-looking variables.
However, for forecasting and day-to-day sensitivity analysis we often need to
compromise between theoretical structure and data mining, but the preceding discussion
reveals that a clear and delineate treatment of expectations is a minimum requirement.
"Larger-scale econometric models have proven useful to central banks in providing
answers to questions related to the design and implementation of monetary policy, and
within the last few years, a new generation of large-scale econometric policy models have
come into use.  ... .  These econometric models are designed to address specific questions
of relevance for the actual design of monetary policy.  The FRB/US model is structured to
allow simulations to be conducted under alternative assumptions about expectations
formation.  ... .  Other countries have also actively developed econometric models for
policy work combining both estimated and calibrated relationships." (Walsh 1998 p. 34)
Walsh reports models for Canada and  New Zealand, but the EEC’s Quest model and the
IMF’s Multimod can also be mentioned.  Recently,  we developed at the NBB a model in
the spirit of the FRB/US model, Jeanfils (2000).  This approach has many advantages.
First it allows us to use a forward-looking approach which, as monetary policy takes time to
affect output and inflation, is essential to monetary policy-making.  Its flexibility allows us to
examine the model’s sensitivity to alternative expectation scenarios.  Second, the
introduction of the rational expectations hypothesis, which explicitly distinguishes between
lags stemming from either the economic environment (adjustment costs and inertia effects)
or expectations, limits the susceptibility of the model to the Lucas critique.
The rational expectations hypothesis is now so widespread in the macroeconomic
literature that it seems undoubtedly a valid approximation of the way expectations are
formed, and there is now no point in working without it.  The assumption was introduced in
somewhat simplified Neo-Classical models, but there is currently a pervasive treatment of
expectations in a large number of other models basically structured along New-KeynesianNBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 5
lines.  The rational expectations hypothesis should indeed be separated from the market-
clearing hypothesis.  The former simply assumes that agents form their expectations in an
informed and efficient manner (they do not make systematic errors).  Expectations are
essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory.  If that theory is a
Keynesian one in which market disequilibrium can persist, then rational expectations may
be seen as a valid Keynesian mechanism.
Moreover, many macroeconomic events have shown some kind of jumpiness, in
the rational expectations sense, which can hardly be explained and modelled without
forward looking expectations.  Asset valuation is the most obvious example: the current
price of an asset is determined by its expected future incomes.  The importance of
forward-looking expectations is also true for variables that cannot be freely and quickly
adjusted.  The presence of adjustment costs means that agents must balance the cost of
deviation from their desired level for the variables in question with the cost of adjusting to
reach that desired level.  In this case, the importance of  expectations is determined by the
strength of constraints on dynamic adjustment: if a variable is slow to respond ( e.g. once a
firm’s optimal level of capacity has been decided, the decision to invest also takes time to
generate productive capital), forecasts about more distant economic conditions are needed
(the greater the friction, the farther into the future expectations must go) to find a route for
adjustment towards the target level.
3.  A SIMPLE, ONE- EQUATION FORWARD-LOOKING MODEL
Most of the q uestions that economists have to answer involve expectations of
future interest rates, exchange rates, oil prices and so on.  A reasonably sophisticated
treatment of expectations is thus essential. However the explicit introduction of forward-
looking expectations formation in macro-models gives rise to several complications.
It is easier to outline the role of expectations using a simple model for which a
solution can be calculated analytically.  To keep the maths as simple as possible, I restrict
the model to a linear relationship between one variable, one expectation and one
stochastic shock.
This simple model assumes that inflation depends on the expected next period's
inflation plus an exogenous shock6 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
t z 1 t t E t d + + p b = p (1)
where pt is the rate of inflation at time t , b is a discount factor and Etpt+1 is the expected
inflation rate between period t and period t+1. The variable z is an exogenous shift variable
which could represent a true exogenous variable for the model -e.g. oil price- or a policy
variable -e.g. interest rate or money supply.  It could also represent a stochastic error term
as in an econometric equation and, in that case, d=1.  If zt is a policy variable, then we can
represent the design of alternative policy rules by specifying a different stochastic process
for zt.  All variables are expressed as deviations from their long-run or target level.  Section
five gives a structural interpretation of this equation.
Suppose the question we have to answer is about the effect of a shift in z t on
inflation.
The next period's inflation will be determined in the same way as this period's
inflation:
1 t z 2 t 1 t E 1 t + d + + p + b = + p (2)
Note that all future rates of inflation can be expressed in the same way.  By iterating
forward, we finally arrive at  an expression for current inflation in terms of current and




Ø + + b + + b + + b + d = p ... 3 t Ez 3
2 t Ez 2
1 t Ez t z t (3)
Therefore, to examine a shock in variable z, it is necessary to specify all its future
values even beyond the sample  we are interested in.  For example, in order to examine
the sensitivity of a two-year forecast in a quarterly model (t=1, …, 8) to a change in money
supply, it is also necessary to make assumptions about future values of money for t=9,….
Does it remain at the same value as in t=8; or does it go back to the baseline, and in the
latter case does it return gradually or in one jump ?
In accordance with Taylor (1993a), I now explain how these questions can affect
the results.  Suppose that zt has the very general formNBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 7
i t
0 i
i t z - e ￿
¥
=
q =  , (4)
where qi are parameters and ei  is a serially uncorrelated innovation with zero mean.
This is a very general representation.  Indeed, consider for instance the particular
case of an AR(1) process









which means that the weights on e  must be decreasing geometrically.
The simplified model  used to illustrate the impact of shocks consists of equations
(1) and (4). The following distinctions as to the nature of a particular shock can be made:
(i) Temporary versus permanent shocks
- zt is purely temporary when  q0=1 and  qi=0, for i>0.  Any shock z t is expected to
disappear (or to return to the baseline) immediately after the period in which it has
occurred:
Et zt+i = 0 for i>0 whatever the actual value of zt;
- zt is permanent when qi=1, "i ‡ 0.  Any shock z t is expected to remain forever.  Then
all future values of z t+i are expected to be equal to z t : Et z t+i = z t  for i>0 whatever the
actual value of zt;
- in between the latter two extremes, zt exhibits intermediate persistence.  With qi=µ
i  , a
wide range of intermediate persistence processes can be modelled by letting µ vary
from 0 to 1  (the larger the value of  µ, the longer the persistence).  In this case the
shock dies out geometrically in accordance with an AR(1) process.8 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
(ii) Anticipated versus unanticipated shocks
In forward-looking expectations models, the response also depends on whether
the shift in the variable is (credibly in the case of a policy variable) anticipated or
unanticipated.  If we have to analyse now (in i=0) the effect of a shock that will occur k
periods ahead, e.g. an interest rate increase next quarter, we can simulate:
- an unanticipated shift by setting qi=0 for i=0 to k-1, i.e. from now up to the period
preceding the shift, so that Ei(zk)=0 for 0£i<k and Ei(zk)= k e  for i‡k;
- an anticipated shift by making the expectation of the variable z k made at any time
equal to z k .  Such a shock anticipated k periods in advance will be represented by
zt=et-k and, if it is expected to die out geometrically, will be simulated by setting qi=0 for
i=0, … , k-1 and qi=µ
i-k for i=k,k+1, … 0<µ<1.
Combining these definitions, four cases of one-period shocks are now examined.
The intention is to find a timeframe for inflation, pt, given the expected characteristics of zt.
In order to obtain the results that follow, we can use the method of undetermined
coefficients.  It consists in representing pt in an unrestricted infinite moving average form
i t
0 i
i t - e ￿
¥
=
g = p . (5)
Then the solution for  pt requires finding the values for the undetermined
coefficients gi such that equations (1) and (5) are satisfied.  These coefficients are obtained
by substituting pt and Et pt+1 in (1) making use of (5) and then solving gi in terms of b, d and
m.
Results are also depicted in figures 1-(a) to (d).
(a) Unexpected and temporary
t t de = pNBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 9
The interpretation is trivial since inflation only changes the period in which the
exogenous variable, e.g. money supply, is shifted, and is unaffected otherwise.  This is
due to the fact that it is expected to return to its original level (of zero) the period after.
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For µ < 1, inflation increases by less than the initial impulse in the money supply
because of the expected deflation that occurs as inflation returns to its base value
(normalised at zero in the figure).  In the case of a permanent shock (µ=1), inflation would
move once and for all proportionally to the shock with a coefficient of 
) 1 ( b -
d
higher than in
the case µ < 1 because there would be no expected future deflation, since the shock
remains at its new level.
(c) Anticipated and temporary
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In this case inflation "jumps" at the time of the announcement and then gradually
rises until the increase in the money supply actually happens.  Note that at the actual date
of the shock, the increase in inflation is the same as in the unexpected case.10 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
(d) Anticipated and dying out geometrically
Here the shock is anticipated k periods in advance : qi=µ
i-k ,  i t
0 i
i
t z - e ￿
¥
=
m =  for
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µ 1 t
In this case, too, the anticipation of an increase in the money supply induces a
jump in inflation which then increases gradually until the shock actually takes place.
Figure 1 - Inflation: impulse response to various configurations of shocksNBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 11
These small examples show the importance of adequately specifying the timing
and nature of the shocks.
4.  THE LUCAS CRITIQUE
Suppose that a policy advisor knows that inflation is determined by
t t y 1 t t E t p e + k + + p b = p (6)
in which  t y represents the output gap: the deviations of the log of real output from  its
trend path.
Here there are two shocks to the system: a demand shock (the output gap) yt and a supply
shock ept.  Suppose that
1 t t 1 t + p u + p e p t = + p e (7)
where  p u is a white noise disturbance.
For simplicity, suppose that the monetary authorities can perfectly control the
output gap through their instrument, and that their objective is to stabilise output so that the
output gap remains fixed at zero.  The policy rule is thus yt =0  (zero output gap policy).
But suppose also that, under this policy, inflation is judged too volatile.  The policy maker
therefore calculates how yt can be manipulated to reduce inflation volatility.
Under the zero output gap policy combined with the law of motion of ep in (7), the






+ - p p t = p (8)12 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
Conventional policy evaluation might proceed as follows.  In a first step, estimate  p t  in the
reduced-form equation (8) over the sample period.  Second, use this estimated equation
as a model generating expectations i.e.  t 1 t t E p p t = + p .  Finally, substitute these
expectations into (6) to yield
t t y t t p e + k + p p bt = p (9)





p e + k
= p (10)
This type of relation was often estimated without reference to a structural model.
Then an advisor could be asked to answer a typical question of the kind "Can you estimate
the influence of the output gap on inflation ? " The policy maker asking this question knows
that if the econometrician finds a coefficient of one, for example, he will be able to alter
inflation by one percent by changing the output gap by the same percentage.  But if he
used to pursue a zero output policy, this conclusion would obviously be erroneous.
Considering a new policy rule of the form
1 t g t y - p e = (11)
one would be tempted to substitute (11) in (10) and to use the result to calculate the
optimal g.  This procedure is false if expectations are rational since the coefficient relating
output gap to inflation in (10) is not structural.  The true coefficient is a function of the
policy rule.  Actually, (10) is only valid under the policy rule yt = 0.
The correct approach would have been to substitute  1 t g t y - p e =  directly into (6)
and then to calculate the stochastic process for pt .  This results in the following MA(1)
process:NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 13
1 t g t 1
g 1




This relation which differs from (10) in which the policy rule has been substituted, can be
used to simulate alternative policy rules.  For instance,  if the monetary authorities mainly
care about inflation volatility, the optimal rule can be found by minimising the variance of
inflation with respect to g.
5.  LINEAR MODEL WITH MORE THAN ONE VARIABLE
Since economic policies are discussed in a framework that involves more than
one equation, the simple model above is generalised. In this respect, it is useful to recall
that the monetary policy literature has mainly followed two routes.  First, following on from
Taylor (1993b), many authors have advocated simple policy rules that receive a given
functional form based on both economic and control theory.  Coefficients of such rules are
chosen either by reference to historical experience, as in the Taylor rule, or by optimisation
in which the discounted value of expected inflation deviations is minimised by the choice of
coefficients given the structure of the economy.  In the latter case, the rule is called an
'optimal' simple rule.  In order to gauge the performance of the rules, many papers analyse
the behaviour of a given model using different policy rules by modifying their parameters or
their arguments, using rule-consistent inflation forecasts rather than current inflation, Batini
and Haldane (1999), or by changing the forecast horizon, etc.  Second, more recently
following the impetus given by Currie and Levine (1993), the dominant approach consists
in specifying an objective function for the policy maker and then solving a given model to
obtain the optimal policy.  This second route uses optimisation not just to choose the
coefficients of a rule but to set the entire trajectory for interest rates that minimises the
representative loss function.
To describe the solution methods and to introduce optimal policies, I use a simple
model called the 'new synthesis' model ascribed to Woodford (1999) and
Clarida,Gali,Gertler (1999). The model contains two log-linear approximations to Euler
equations describing decisions of households and firms: a dynamic "IS" curve relating the
output gap inversely to the real interest rate and an expectational Phillips curve relating
inflation positively to the output gap already given in (6).  They are written as:14 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
yt 1 t y t 1 t t t i t y e + + + + p - j - = E ] E [ (13)
t t y 1 t t E t p e + k + + p b = p (14)
where  t i is the deviation of the nominal interest rate  (the central bank instrument) from its
steady state value.
Since eyt shifts the IS curve, it is interpreted as a demand shock, e.g. variations in
government purchases, in consumer confidence, etc.   The negative effect of the real rate
on current output reflects intertemporal substitution in consumption.  The second equation
stems from price-setting behaviour à la Calvo (1983) in which, due to assumptions about
preferences, technology and the labour market as demonstrated in Gali and Gertler
(1999), the marginal cost has been replaced by a linear function of the output gap.  Calvo's
approach makes it possible to rationalise price rigidities.  The term  ept shifts the price
equation and is thus a price shock.  It will be called a cost-push shock in the sense that it
captures anything that affects marginal costs other than demand shocks, e.g. changes in
distortionary taxation, in degree of market power of firms, in the wage premium over
marginal productivity, etc.  This term allows the model to generate variations in inflation
arising independently of movements in excess demand, yt .




+ p e + + l b = p
0 i
i t i t y i
t E t (15)
which highlights the sources of inflation : the present value of excess demand , y, and the
present value of cost- push variables.
In the presence of nominal rigidities, monetary policy can change the short-term
real interest rate by modifying the nominal rate and in turn affecting output.  Iterating








+ e + + + p - + j - =
0 i
i yt ) i 1 t i t i ( t E t y (16)NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 15
shows that the output gap depends on the expected future pattern of real rates and
demand shocks.  In this forward-looking context, expectations about the way the central
bank will set interest rates in the future play a crucial role.
5.1.  A simple rule without specifying an objective function
If i t is taken as the instrument, it is not necessary to specify a money market
equilibrium condition (LM curve).  However the model (13)-(14) would be unstable if the
nominal interest rate were to remain fixed.  In order to avoid divergence between
aggregate demand and aggregate supply it is necessary to introduce a feedback rule for
the interest rate.
Suppose the central bank uses the following ad hoc policy rule, known to the
public:
t y y 1 t t E t i g + + p p g = (17)
Modified versions of this rule have been successfully estimated by Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (1997) for the US, Germany and Japan.  It is a forward-looking version of the
Taylor rule in which the central bank responds to expected inflation, rather than to lagged
inflation.
Substituting the reaction function (17) in (13) results in a system of two linear
difference equations that can be solved for the movement in output and inflation when
shocks hit the economy.  Note that the policy rule is substituted from the start and not in
the solution, so that this strategy is Lucas-critique-proof.  The solution of the model can be
represented as a two dimensional linear vector autoregressive moving average system
with cross-equation constraints:
yt ) L ( y t ) L ( t e p q + p e pp q = p
yt ) L ( yy t ) L ( y t y e q + p e p q =16 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
where  j , i q (L) are polynomials in the lag operator and their parameters are complex
functions of the structural parameter of the model, k, b, j,  y ,g p g .
5.2.  Optimal policies
The current literature emphasises the difference between simple rules and fully
optimal solutions derived from an intertemporal optimisation procedure.  To follow the
second route, we need an objective function for the policy maker. According to the
literature, the objective of monetary policy is to minimise the squared deviations of output
and inflation (its target variables) from their respective target levels.  Sometimes the


















0 E 0 W (18)
} 2 ) 1 t i t i ( i
2 *) y t y ( y
2 *) t {( t L - - l + - l + p - p = (19)
s.t. the structure of the economy given in (13) and (14)
Suppose in addition that the shocks eyt and ept evolve according to
1 t t 1 t + p u + p e p t = + p e (20)
1 yt yt y 1 yt + u + e t = + e (21)
where  1 , 0 £ l t p t £  and upt , uyt are white noise processes with variances  2
y and 2 s p s .
This simple model, like many other macro models, especially those used to
analyse monetary policy, involves forward-looking behaviour.  This forward-looking
characteristic exacerbates the differences between possible optimisation procedures.  In
                                                      
1  The relative weights of the targets do not come from a utility based welfare function and are therefore not entirely suited
for analysis of optimal policy in terms of a welfare criterion, but an extension along these lines is not the purpose of the
present paper.  On the other hand, this approach has been justified by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and Woodford
(1999a) as a quadratic approximation of the theoretically correct welfare measure, the expected utility level of the
representative household.  In this case,  the relative weights depend on the deep preference parameters of the model.NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 17
addition, except in very simple models, no analytical solution exists, implying that some
numerical methods are needed to find the optimal policy and the rational expectations
equilibrium.  I therefore derive the equilibrium first, and then present equilibrium responses
to shocks for some small stylised models.
Most of these models can be cast in a more general  linear-quadratic optimal
control framework as described in Currie and Levine (1993), Söderlind (1999) or Hansen
and Sargent (2000), enabling us to deal with more sophisticated economies.  This
framework provides the most frequently used tools in research on optimal policies.
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where X t is a n 1 x 1 vector of predetermined (backward-looking) variables that can be
lagged endogenous or exogenous, X 0 is given , ct is a n 2 x 1 vector of forward-looking
variables which are free to "jump" in response to news, ut is a k x 1 vector of instruments.
For example, in the simple model above the elements of Xt are the exogenous shocks eyt
and ept , and those of ct are pt and yt , while the only instrument is the short-term interest
rate.  At the beginning of period t, Xt and ut are realised .  Then u t is set by the central
bank. Finally ct results and period t ends.  All variables are observable.
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From (23), it is clear that, given the simple structure of the economy as described in (13),
(14) and (18) to (21), Q is a diagonal matrix with zeros and the weights attached to each18 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
target on the main diagonal, and since there is no cross-product term between the states
and the control, U is a vector of zero.  If the central bank does not care about interest rate
fluctuations, i.e.  0 i = l  in (19), R is a vector of zero.
The policy problem is to choose a sequence for the instruments u t in order to
generate a timeframe for the target variables that minimises the loss function (23) subject
to the structure of the economy (22).  The combination of quadratic loss and linear
constraints yields a certainty-equivalent decision rule for the  path of the instruments.  This
means that the optimal decision rule in this case is identical with the rule for the
corresponding non-stochastic problem.  In other words, although the objective function
depends on the variance-covariance of the shocks through (22), the optimal decision is
independent of this variance-covariance.  This is particularly useful to a policy-maker
because it implies that a rule appropriate to all initial states of the system and to all types
of disturbance is available.  The different optimisation procedures are summarised below,
in accordance with, Currie and Levine  (1993), Söderlind (1999) and Woodford (1999b).
The rest of this section describes the three optimisation procedures that are
usually followed in the literature: commitment, discretion and optimal simple rules.
5.2.1.  (Unrestricted) commitment equilibrium
In this case, the policy maker is assumed to be able to commit himself at time 0,
once and for all, to a reaction that minimises his loss function (23) subject to the structure
of the economy (22).  He can therefore give a credible signal that the reaction will be
sustained over time.  The possibility of commitment matters in this kind of optimisation:
because of the presence of the forward terms  1 t t E and 1 t y t E + p +  in equation (13) and
(14), the value of the period loss function L t that can be achieved at a given moment
depends upon the private sector expectations about the future values of the endogenous
variables and consequently about the way the policy maker can affect those expectations.
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that must satisfy:
(i) the n+k first-order conditions with  Xt+1 and  Xt are obtained by differentiating the
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3 (25)
t Uu t QY t 1 t t E ' A b - b - X = + X b ; (26)
and this last condition can be more compactly written if we use (25) to eliminate the
instruments as:




￿ - - b (27)
(ii) the structure of the model (22)
(iii) the n1 initial conditions from the predetermined X0 and the n2 initial conditions from  X20
= 0 (n2x1), where  œ ß
ø
Œ º





t  is partitioned so that  X1t is of dimension n 1
associated with predetermined variables and  X2t is of dimension n 2 associated with
the forward-looking variables
4.  This partitioning is useful since the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the non-predetermined variables are themselves
predetermined, whilst the Lagrange multipliers associated with predetermined
variables are non-predetermined
5.
                                                      
2 The corresponding sequence in the simple model is{ept, eyt,  pt , yt , it , XISt , XASt } where XISt and XASt are the Lagrange
multipliers associated with respectively (13) and (14).
3 The procedure can be adapted if R
-1 does not exist.
4 Currie and Levine (1993) p. 153 show that a condition for W0 to be optimal is  X20 = 0.
5 See p. 102 in Currie and Levine (1993).20 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
Leaving aside technical details concerning its derivation, which are described in
Söderlind (1999), we can show that, in the commitment solution, the predetermined






































and the non predetermined variables (X1t , u t , ct) are written as linear functions of the































If R is invertible then (25) gives the optimal policy:  ] t , t X [ t Y c ”  is given by (28) and (29)
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note that, given the initial values X20=0n2x1 and since there is no shock in X2t , (28) implies
that
t 2 22 A t X 21 A 1 t 2 X + = + X
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Substituting this in (29), it is possible to rewrite the optimal rule under commitment as a





only.  This representation involves many lags (= a rule withNBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 21
memory), making the system dynamic, as we will demonstrate in some illustrative
examples.
Anticipating a little, it is worth noting that in the commitment case:
- contrary to the discretion c ase, the central bank does not take private sector
expectations as given, but recognises that its policy choice effectively determines
those expectations.
- contrary to the  simple rule case, the choice of rule is not restricted to being dependent
on the contemporaneous value of the shock, but instead is allowed to be a function of
the entire history of shocks.
In the commitment case the optimal policy also depends on the shadow price of
the forward-looking variables.  This policy is only optimal ex-ante, but ex-post it becomes
sub-optimal and there is an incentive to renege.  Indeed, a once-and-for-all commitment
made today about the way the central bank will adjust its policy to affect endogenous
variables in latter periods would not necessarily coincide with what would be optimally
chosen in latter periods without such an advance commitment.  This is the problem of
time-inconsistency (see Kydland and Prescott (1977) or Barro and Gordon (1983) ).  Time-
inconsistency stems from the presence of X20 .  Actually, the decision maker who will have
to solve the problem at a later date T will choose  { }
0 i i T , i T u , i T Y
=
¥
+ X + +  that satisfy:
(i) first-order conditions with XT+1 and XT ;
(ii) the structure of the model (22);
(iii) and the initial conditions  X2T = 0 which are in general not satisfied by the optimal plan
under commitment chosen at date zero, the time of the initial optimisation.
There is however another equilibrium concept involving another type of
commitment that  Woodford (1999c) and McCallum and Nelson (2000) find more attractive.
Instead of using (27) and (22) with the initial conditions (iii) to determine the paths of
{ }
0 i i T , i T u , i T Y
=
¥
+ X + + , the central bank can use   (27) and (22) without any initial
conditions by applying (27) in all periods.  This "timeless perspective" means ignoring any
conditions prevailing at the start of the regime; e.g. by seeing the decision to apply (27) as
being made far in the past.  There is no dynamic inconsistency in this case: the values22 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
} 2 , 2 u , 2 Y { X  chosen by this procedure in period 2 agree with the values chosen
expectationally in period 1
6.  In other words, the central bank adopts "not the pattern of
behavior from now on that it would be optimal to choose, taking previous expectations as
given, but rather the pattern of behavior to which it would have wished to commit itself at a
date far in the past, contingent upon the random events that have occurred in the
meantime.  This timeless perspective ensures that the program of action that one would
choose at date one is indeed the continuation of the program that one would choose at
date zero: in each case it is the program that one would have wished to commit to at a
date far in the past." (Woodford (1999c) p. 18).  Actually, many studies of optimal policy in
forward-looking models, including Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), have considered
policies which are labelled "commitment" but which should be considered as timeless
perspective policies, since these policies ignore the period 0 conditions and use only the
remaining portion of the commitment conditions.
5.2.2. Discretion equilibrium
Since he cannot credibly manipulate beliefs in the absence of commitment, the
policy maker takes the expectations of private agents as of time t as given (Nash
equilibrium). Then, depending on the central bank's optimal rule, the private sector forms
beliefs rationally.  The private sector forms its expectations by taking account of how the
central bank adjusts its policy, given that it is free to re-optimise every period.  In a rational
expectations equilibrium, the central bank has no incentive to change its plan unexpectedly
even though it has the discretion to do so.  The policy is therefore time-consistent.  The
optimal policy problem at each date can be cast in a dynamic-programming format, and
the solution results in a policy reaction as a function of the current  state variables only.
Such a time-consistent solution must satisfy Bellman's "Principle of Optimality"
which states that an optimal policy has the property that, whatever the initial state and
decision, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state
resulting from the first decision.  Here it is useful to rewrite the loss function (23') as
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
+ b + + + = 1 t W t E t Ru '
t u t Uu '
t Y 2 t QY '
t Y t W (30)
                                                      
6
For a clear exposition of this procedure see McCallum and Nelson (2000).NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 23
The dynamic programming solution then seeks a stationary solution in which Wt is
minimised at time t subject to (22), in the knowledge that a similar procedure will be used
to minimise Wt+1 at time t+1.  In other words, the Principle of Optimality says that the
optimal value of Wt at time t, say f*(X(t)), must satisfy the Bellman equation
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
+ b + + + = ) 1 t X ( * f t E t Ru '
t u t Uu '
t Y 2 t QY '
t Y
t u
Min ) t X ( * f (31)
The optimal response in the once-and-for-all commitment equilibrium was found
to be a linear function of Xt and X2t.  The presence of X2t which resulted in a representation
involving lags of Xt was the source of the time inconsistency in that case.  This reveals a
necessary condition for a time-consistent rule, namely that it must not depend on past
values of the state vector.  Therefore, a solution should be of the form:
t X disc F t u - = (32)
To obtain an optimal policy linear in X t the loss function must be quadratic in X t
only.  Then we write  1 t X 1 t V '
1 t X 1 t W + + + = +  in (31).  The complication of this
optimisation is that the objective function depends on the forward-looking variables which
are endogenous and are a function of expected future values of themselves and of the
predetermined variables.  However, since the decision rule is a linear function of the
predetermined variables at time t, the forward-looking variables will also be linear functions
of these predetermined variables.  It may be written as
1 t X 1 t C 1 t + + = + c .
Then in a rational expectations equilibrium,  private sector expectations are formed
according to
1 t X t E 1 t C 1 t t E + + = + c (33)
Using (33) to eliminate ct+1  and (22) to eliminate Xt+1 and ct  in the right-hand side of (31),
the problem can be rewritten in terms of Xt , ut and V24 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
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where matrices and vectors with a "tilde" are functions of the original Q, U, R, A, B and of
Ct.  The expression between brackets must be minimised by choosing the vector of
instruments, ut which yields the following first-order conditions:
t X t A
~
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or
t X t F t u - = (36)
Now we can envisage F t converging to a stationary time-consistent value by
iterating on C t and V t+1 which, in the case of convergence, will give the solution under
discretion:
- the first n1 equations can be characterised by
1 t t X disc M 1 t X + e + = + (37a)
- and the other variables are calculated as
t X disc F t u - = (37b)
t X disc C t = c (37c)
Thus, the optimal policy implies setting u t as a function of only current X t rather than the
sequence{ }t
0 s s X
=
as under commitment.  Note that discretionary policies are sub-optimal.
In forward-looking models, the discretion solution does not take into account the ability of
the central bank to influence private sector expectations as is the case in the commitment
solution.  This creates an inefficiency that results from discretionary policy-making in
addition to the familiar inflationary bias.NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 25
Finally, it is worth mentioning that if there is no forward-looking variable, there is
no difference between discretion and unrestricted commitment: the difference stemming
from the shadow prices of the forward-looking variables  X2t and the initial conditions
associated with them.
5.2.3. (Restricted) commitment to a simple rule
The optimal rule under commitment may become quite complex even for simple
models in the sense that it may involve many lags of the state variables.  Alternatively, the
policy maker can commit himself in period t-1 to adhering in period t and forever to a
restricted decision rule of the form:
' '
t , '
t X F t u œ ß
ø
Œ º
Ø c - = (38).
In this context, we optimise with respect to the loss function W0 in (23) and the
restriction that the choice of F should give a unique equilibrium in order to obtain the
parameters in F.  It is a commitment rule, since the policy maker will respect this rule in all
subsequent periods, even if it would be optimal to deviate from it in certain cases.  This
rule is normally not the same as the globally optimal rule (under commitment) since the
latter does not restrict the decision rule to be a function of Xt and ct (in the simple model yt
and pt) only.  Since there is commitment, the equilibrium is calculated by assuming that the
private sector takes (38) for granted when it forms its expectations.
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(39)
which is a system of first-order difference equations of the same kind as (27) and can thus
be solved by applying the same method which yields solutions analogous to (28) and (29).
In an equilibrium, predetermined variables can be expressed as function of their own
lagged values and the shocks26 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
1 t t MX 1 t X + u + = + (40)
while forward-looking variables are linear functions of predetermined variables
t CX t = c (41)
and instruments are of course given by the rule (38).  For the simple two-equation model,
an analytical solution was presented in section 5-1.
Since the term 'rule' has been used in different ways, it is useful to make the
terminology more explicit and to clarify the difference between (17) and (38).  In the
extensive literature dealing with the definition of a rule, prominent examples are Svensson
(1999) or Svensson and Woodford (1999) for a comparison between targeting rules and
instrument rules.  The following definitions from Svensson are of interest in the present
context.  A proper  reaction function expresses the instrument as a function of
predetermined variables.  If the instrument rule involves forward-looking variables such as
(17), it is an equilibrium condition rather than a reaction function.  It is called an implicit
rule.  But it is a simple rule in the sense that it has only a few arguments.  In order to find
the explicit reaction function expressing the instruments as a function of predetermined
variables only, the model (13)-(14) must be solved with the restriction (17) as was done
above.  A linear explicit instrument rule (a linear reaction function) can be written as:
ut=FXt
6. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
I now return to the "new synthesis" model in which the monetary authorities set
the interest rate in order to minimise the discounted sum of squared deviations of inflation
and output gap from their target level.  Since the precise empirical performance of the
model is not fundamental to the issues examined here, I just give some adhoc values to
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Fi = 0 if the central bank does not care about interest rate variability.
Parameters in this simple rule are not derived in order to give the best possible
outcome in terms of the welfare function, and the rule is therefore not an "optimal" simple
rule.  The loss function implies that inflation is twice as important as output and that the
central bank does not care about fluctuations in the nominal interest rate.  However, if it
wants to smooth the interest rate, both li and Fi will be fixed at 0.5.
6.1.  New synthesis model : basic model
The economy described by the system of equations (13) and (14) implies that
lagged values of any endogenous variables play no role whatsoever in the determination
of the equilibrium values of inflation, output or interest rates at a given date.  On the other
hand, they involve important dynamic links between expectations of the future outcomes to
the present state of the economy through the presence of both  1 t t E and 1 t y t E + p +  in
the equations determining equilibrium at date t.  Being purely forward-looking, this model
overemphasises the difference between discretion and commitment
7.
Figures 2(a) to (c) show impulse response functions following a cost-push shock
1 1 = p s = p e , implying an increase in the inflation rate by one percentage point if there is
                                                      
7  The Matlab codes developed by Söderlind and Klein are used in what follows.28 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
no movement in the output gap or inflation expectations.  Equation (20) implies that the
shock is autocorrelated and dies out geometrically.
The dynamics of the model stem from the persistence of the shocks according to
(20) and (21).  However, as shown by comparing equations (29) and (37), the commitment
equilibrium contains more dynamics than the equilibrium in the discretion case.  Under
both optimisation procedures, the cost-push shock increases inflation.  The central bank
responds by raising the nominal interest rate by more than inflation in order to increase the
real rate, although the commitment equilibrium is characterised by a sort of gradual
adjustment stemming from its richer dynamics.  This, in turn, causes demand to contract
below capacity and via the Phillips curve also exerts a negative impact on inflation.
However, the records in terms of target variables differ with the optimisation procedure.  A
central bank which realises that private agents are forward-looking must also realise that
the evolution of future output and inflation depends not only on its current decisions on
interest rates but also on how private agents expect it to conduct monetary policy in the
future.  It follows  that a more desirable outcome may be achieved if the central bank can
make private sector expectations of its future interest rate policy adjust in an appropriate
way in response to shocks.  The extent of this influence on private agents' expectations
depends on the credibility of the central bank announcement that it will behave in a certain
way in the future as a result of the shocks that have occurred earlier.  Depending on this
announcement, the following cases can be distinguished:NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 29
Figure 2 - New synthesis Model: impulse responses to a cost-push shock
- discretion: because the output gap depends on the future movement of interest rates,
current inflation depends not only on current output gaps but also on expected future
output gaps.  The policy maker wants to convince the public that he prefers to reduce
future output today.  But promises made in the past do not constrain current policy.
Therefore, the central bank will later have an incentive to renege on its promise of
contractionary policy and, instead will promise again to act in the future.  As the policy
maker is unable to give a credible commitment, rational private agents will not expect
large future contractions in demand.  Therefore, when the central bank cannot affect
private sector expectations about its behaviour at later dates, even when forward-
looking elements are present in the model, the optimal policy is a function only of the
current state of the economy, and thus consists in reducing current output by
increasing the current real interest rate but letting future output revert to zero over time
as inflation returns to target;30 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
- conversely, the optimal response under commitment is to continue reducing output as
long as inflation remains above target.  The credible announcement that output will
continue to be reduced as long as necessary in the future has the immediate effect of
dampening current inflation.  Cost-push shocks therefore generate lower current
inflation effects under commitment.  Intuitively, the central bank can make credible
promises about future policy and thereby affect the expectations of private agents,
which in turn affect their behaviour today.  This credibility allows the central bank to
stabilise output and inflation more effectively.  Comparing figures 2-a and 2-b clarifies
this point: the cost-push shock increases current inflation by a factor of around 0.7
under commitment as compared to 1 under discretion.  Moreover, this result is
obtained with a less aggressive increase in the current nominal interest rate
8.  Note
finally that here, as opposed to Barro and Gordon's (1983) analysis, the gain from
commitment does not stem from the desire of the policy maker to push output above
potential, but from the forward-looking nature of inflation, and more specifically from
the importance of expectations about future policy.
- the simple rule case looks very much like the discretion case, since both result in a
decision rule that is linear only in the current state variables.  Only the coefficients are
different.
The lack of intrinsic dynamics does not allow the basic model to match the data,
and consequently, some extensions have been proposed in empirical analysis.  I examine
below some simple versions of such extensions with the aim of showing how optimal
responses to shocks are explained according to different model specifications.  The choice
of both the appropriate specification and the parameter values is a matter of empirical
investigation which is beyond the scope of this paper.
6.2.  Predetermined prices
Small-scale theoretical models often make an assumption of short-term price
stickiness.  Suppose that prices have to be set just one period in advance, that is pt+1 is
known already in period t.  In this case, the demand equation (13) is unaltered but
equation (14)  is leaded one period to give:
                                                      
8  The impression one might have from figure 2-a that the interest rate is not raised in period 1 is a consequence of theNBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 31
1 t t E 1 t y t E 2 t t E 1 t + p e + + k + + p b = + p (42)
Figures 3-(a) to (c) show impulse responses of the model with predetermined prices to the
same autocorrelated cost-push shock as in the basic model.  Prices cannot change at the
time of the shock (by assumption), but output and the nominal interest rate can:
- Under commitment, the nominal interest rate is indeed modified at time t=1.
Remember that the policy maker has two arguments in his loss function: inflation and
output.  Since the former is fixed for period t=1, the policy maker will try to stabilise the
latter provided this strategy does not affect  performance in the following periods.  He
therefore lowers the nominal rate in order to push down the real rate.  This is
reinforced by the cost-push shock which impacts on future inflation  p2 and thus on
inflation expectations in period 1: E1p2 is high and the ex-ante real rate, (i1-E1p2 ), is
low.  Such a lowering of the real interest rate makes consumption (here output) more
attractive today (in period 1) than tomorrow (period 2), and this mechanism enables
the central bank to keep output totally stable today.  The low expected output in period
2  drives down p2 according to the Phillips curve (42), so that inflation rises in period 2
by far less than the initial shock, actually one third.
                                                                                                                                                                      
choice of parameter values and is not a general property.32 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
Figure 3 - Predetermined prices: impulse responses to a cost-push shock
- In the simple rule case, the nominal rate also decreases in period 1, but very little,
since output does not decrease much in period 1 and the reaction coefficient of the
interest rate to the output gap in the policy rule, Fy, equals one half.
- With a discretionary policy, the central bank can keep output totally stable,  so that
inflation just evolves according to (42) with a zero output gap, i.e. yt+1 set to zero, and
consequently follows the shock.  The relation is slightly different from one-to-one, due
to the presence of the discount factor, b.  The central bank cannot affect inflation in t
by changing it since the former was set in period t-1.  Thus, being confronted with a
price shock, the policy maker who optimises under discretion in period t will stabilise
the only variable he can affect in his loss function: output.  In order to do this he will
set the nominal rate equal to expected inflation in order to leave the real rate
unchanged.  This is why in figure 3-(b) the interest rate leads inflation by one period.NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 33
To account for the observed persistence in macroeconomic variables, virtually all
major applied macroeconomic models allow for some form of lagged dependence in output
and inflation.  They will be incorporated in the following sections.
6.3. Inflation persistence : a hybrid Phillips curve
Remember equation (15) which shows that inflation is equal to the present value
of future expected marginal costs, implying that inflation is a “jump” variable.  Even if prices
are set one or two periods in advance, inflation will not exhibit any sluggishness in
subsequent periods.  This seems at odds with the observed persistence in inflation.
Therefore, in order to  match the data more closely, several authors have tried to introduce
inflation persistence.  For instance, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) introduce the hypothesis that
agents negociate nominal wage contracts that remain in effect for four quarters.  In their
contracting decisions, agents compare the current real contract wage with an average of
the real contract wages that were negociated in the recent past and those that are
expected to be negociated in the near future.  This worry about relative wages is used by
these authors as a reason for introducing lagged inflation.  Svensson (1997) appeals to
costs of adjustment or overlapping contracts to justify replacing pt+1 by (1-a)pt+1+apt-1 in his
aggregate supply equation.  The Gali and Gertler (1999) approach will be followed here.
They have suggested the idea that a proportion of firms use a simple rule-of-thumb  based
on recent history of aggregate price behaviour to set prices.  They are referred to as
backward-looking firms and their presence allows the introduction of lagged inflation in
equation (14).  Contrary to Svensson, in this case, the coefficient of (1-a)pt+1+apt-1 is less
than one, implying that there is no vertical Phillips curve in the long run as a consequence
of discounting, (b<1).  This is in line with the 'new synthesis' model in which the coefficient
of expected inflation is also  b.  Gali and Gentler call the resulting equation a ' hybrid'
Phillips curve.
Figures 4-(a) to (c) give impulse responses to a cost-push shock with a hybrid
Phillips curve in which the proportion of backward-looking firms is assumed to be one half.
This change does not appear to modify the functioning of the model.  Inflation which is
assumed to exhibit more sluggishness, increases less on impact but decreases less
afterwards as compared to the basic model.  Under commitment, this protracted
inflationary pressure calls for a tighter monetary policy and also a greater sacrifice ratio
which corresponds to the conventional wisdom, stating that the greater the backward-34 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
looking part of inflation ( e.g. as a consequence of indexation mechanisms), the greater the
sacrifice ratio.  Under discretion, inflation and the interest rate increase less on impact, but
the latter must be maintained at a higher level for a longer period of time.  The sacrifice
ratio is also larger.
Figure 4 - Hybrid Phillips curve: impulse responses to a cost-push shock
6.4. Output persistence
In the models examined above, a change in monetary policy instantaneously
impacted on real output through the contemporaneous relation between the interest rate
and output in the IS curve.  However, it is well recognised that monetary policy takes time
to affect production.  Therefore, output persistence has either been introduced  in an ad
hoc way or has been derived from a utility function that is not additively separable in
consumption over time as in McCallum (1999).  The latter can be introduced in the simple
closed economy used here, while ad hoc specifications are generally used in largerNBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 35
models.  Since habit formation makes consumption demand more stable, output is less
volatile.
The consequences of the introduction of lagged output in (12) are illustrated in
figures 5-(a) to (c).  In the commitment case, the nominal interest rate is raised at the time
of the shock so that the ex-ante real rate increases much more than in the basic model.
Indeed, in order to affect consumption today and to impact on inflation via the aggregate
supply curve, the central bank needs to increase the real rate more under habit
persistence in order to give agents an incentive to postpone consumption.  Thereafter, the
interest rate decreases more quickly under all three optimisation procedures.
Figure 5 - Output persistence: impulse responses to a cost-push shock
6.5. Monetary policy inertia
So  far I have only considered alternative structures of the economy.  It was
supposed that optimal policies did not involve any true element of inertia: any observed36 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
persistence in interest rate fluctuations was the consequence of serial correlation in the
disturbances and/or lags in the structure of the economy.  However, in practice, central
banks adjust the interest rate far more cautiously than models predict: optimal policies
derived in a certainty-equivalent environment, in which the policy maker knows everything
about the world, generally predict much greater volatility in interest rates than is observed.
These models lack dynamics in interest rates setting.  I therefore now introduce inertia in
the central bank's own responses to these disturbances.  The desirable degree of inertia in
the equilibrium response to shocks can be achieved through an explicit simple rule (a
generalisation of the "Taylor rule") in which the interest rate is an increasing function of the
lagged interest rate (Fi>0), or through the assignment of a loss function that penalises
squared interest rate changes (li>0).
In the absence of any smoothing objective, an optimising central bank sets its
interest rates only on the basis of state variables that affect the current or the future
determination of output and inflation.  Past interest rates are then of no significance in
determining the optimal current interest rate level.  The problem is now more complicated
than the cases considered earlier, since the lagged instrument now enters as a state
variable.  The discretionary policy is history-dependent because the central bank's loss
function is hystory-dependent and the implied reaction function will make the nominal
interest rate a function of lagged endogenous variables.NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 37
Figure 6 - Monetary policy inertia: impulse responses to a negative demand shock
When the central bank does not care about the volatility of the nominal interest
rate, li = 0, then it is always optimal to counterbalance any demand shock in full. This can
be seen directly from the aggregate demand curve (13) where any shock  eyt can be
compensated by changing i t by 1/j  eyt which according to our parameterisation, would
result in a 4 p.c. cut in the short rate to compensate for a one standard deviation negative
demand shock.  In this way, output is unaffected by the shock.  There would then be no
effect on inflation either, since the only way the demand shock can affect inflation is via
output.
Figures 6-(a) to (c) show impulse responses following a negative demand shock
with li = 0.5.  Conversely, in the presence of an inertia motive the  interest rate response is
smoother and, consequently, output is lower.  The way inflation reacts depends on the
optimisation procedure.  Under optimal commitment and commitment to a simple rule,
inflation rises after the first period because people believe that the central bank will
maintain the interest rate at a low level to allow output to recover.  Under discretion,
inflation decreases since future lower rates are not anticipated.  It is interesting to note that38 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
the introduction of interest rate inertia creates some cyclical pattern in output.  The initial
negative shock in output is followed by an increase as a consequence of the sustained
lower rate, since market agents know that after the initial cut there will be some loss for the
central bank to bring the rate back to its initial level.  Thus, concerns about interest rate
smoothing lead to a less active policy.
In figures 7-(a) to (c), the impulse responses of a cost-push shock are similar to
those in the basic model.  A price shock implies a temporary increase in inflation which, by
causing a monetary policy adjustment, translates into a negative output gap.  In
comparison with the basic model, interest rate variability is of course reduced.  However,
the optimal movement in interest rates involves a more persistent increase.  Under optimal
commitment and commitment to a simple rule, this promise to maintain interest rates at a
higher level in the future improves the inflation record with less  contraction of output.  The
optimal response under discretion is now also characterised by a kind of gradual
adjustment of the interest rate.
Figure 7 - Monetary policy inertia: impulse responses to a cost-push shockNBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001 39
7.  CONCLUSION
Economists are often asked to answer questions about the effects of either
exogenous macroeconomic shocks or shifts in economic policies.  The need to work with a
coherent and well-articulated model of the economy rather than with ad hoc relationships
or rules-of-thumb is now well recognised, even for the purpose of forecasting.  However,
working with such models requires a rather advanced technical background.  This paper
has examined simple, illustrative versions of more technical and practical models used in
the literature with the aim of giving the reader a basic understanding of the treatment of
forward-looking expectations.
First, techniques suitable for solving one linear stochastic difference equation
were discussed in order to emphasise the need to adequately specify the shocks to be
addressed.  Thereafter, the paper has focused on the design of optimal monetary policies
in small-scale forward-looking models, where inflation is forward-looking and depends on
expectations of future inflation and the output gap.  It has illustrated that forward-looking
variables also complicate the optimisation problem.  For example, optimal policy under
commitment ceases in general to coincide with the outcome of discretionary optimisation.
Although the parameters of these models have been assumed rather than estimated, this
analysis has shown step by step how a simple model can be adapted to  match the data
more closely.  For practical economic policy, one can build simple theoretical models that
approximate the key features of larger more sophisticated ones.  These models can then
be used efficiently in forecasting exercises to address specific questions about the future
pattern of interest rates and exchange rates, e.g. constant versus endogenous rates, in an
informed manner, and also to gauge the actual policy stance.
Important aspects of the research agenda were neglected in this paper, such as
the various econometric techniques used to empirically verify these models.  Throughout
the paper, the certainty-equivalence principle was maintained.  Recent research has also
dealt with cases where certainty-equivalence does not hold: asymmetric information
between the private-sector and the central bank, non-linear models, non-additive
parameters or model uncertainty.  Another interesting topic in the literature  is the problem
of partially observable variables, and the process of learning associated to it .  All these
complications can be classed as extensions, albeit fairly important ones, of the simple
tools presented here.40 NBB WORKING PAPER No.16 - MAY 2001
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